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Towhey criticizes the actions of the Union, which I will not try to refute. While it is not true of all of them, and many are helpful and considerate, there are several TTC employees who have earned the public's wrath due to rude behaviour, laziness, and general incompetence. This is really the only point I will grant him. Towhey goes on to claim that the solution to this problem is to stop funding public transit. The easiest way to do this will simply be to respond to each statement.

"The City should focus its efforts on delivering the services that only a City can deliver. Transit isn't one of them."

Transit is a service that only the city can provide. If transit were to be operated for-profit, any routes that were too costly to maintain would be eliminated. If you're wondering how many of our surface routes are profitable, you might be interested to know that the answer is none. Even the most used surface routes in the system turn a loss. In fact, some of the busiest routes, such as Queen, King, Carlton, and Spadina require half of the operating costs paid for by subsidies. There is no way to improve surface routes to become profitable. While it's true that if the subway were operated as a seperate entity without free transfers the fare recovery ratio of surface routes would look better, it still would cover the operating costs. Even assuming that riders on Queen as an example paid their full fare and did not receive free transfers, based on the average TTC fare in 2009 of $1.78, it would still be unprofitable to run the routes, even ignoring that ridership would drop tremendously as a result of the fare increases. In fact, based on the TTC's work determining that for every dollar saved, 0.23 passengers are lost, the Queen line would lose 7,644 riders per day as a result of no free transfers. Even then, it is presuming that the 0.23 figure is linear, which it is likely not. The TTC has not studied the effect of such an extreme fare increase. Even presuming it is linear, the least loss possible occurs if the Queen streetcar has its average fare raised from the current 97 cents, which includes the effect of free transfers, to around $2.65. To do this, it would require eliminating any free transfers at all, and still having a massive fare increase of almost 50% over pre-raised levels, making adult fares $4.10 with no free transfers. Raising the fare beyond this reaches a point that the lost passengers outweigh any new revenue. Still, at this new obscene rate, revenues would still be more than $14,000 short of operating costs, resulting in a fare recovery of 82%. Reducing service to save money would not help, as that also results in fewer passengers, and thus would not do any better.

To summarize that, the Queen Streetcar, one of the busiest and most important routes in the city, cannot turn a profit. Nor can any of the other streetcar routes. Buses? Finch East, Finch West, Steeles West, Eglinton West, Bathurst... some of the busiest in the city, none of which could turn a profit. In fact, the Dufferin bus looks to be the only busy route that can actually make money. This doesn't even address social issues surrounding transit needs for a city. Strictly economically speaking, transit cannot be successful without government intervention in Toronto.

"But how will people get to and from work, shopping, school, etc? Good question. I imagine more people may drive — so some of the billions the city saves should go to improving its roads. Others will be forced to use bicycles, hire more taxis, join car pools, etc. Apparently, that's good for the environment, even. Bonus.

Eliminating transit does not improve the environment. And improving roads? Exactly what sort of improvements will help the massive new influx of car drivers that will hit the roads, short of demolishing several neighbourhoods to build new freeways, effectively eliminating any cost savings that has occurred from eliminating transit and demolishing our city in the process.

"The subway system, for example, is a good asset. You could run the subway for a profit, I bet, if you were smart about it. Someone would buy the subway system. There would also be buyers for some parts of the street car and busing networks. Some of these could be profitable — either those that feed into the subway, or those that operate in high traffic areas where the subway doesn't exist."

There would not be buyers for any of the surface routes, short of possibly Coxwell, Dufferin, Jane, Main, Ossington, Royal York South, and Wellesley. Even these with the exception of Coxwell, Dufferin, and Main may not attract any interest.

Many bus routes, however, would be abandoned. They're not profitable. Such is life. The TTC should have dumped these routes long ago. But what about the people who need them? Well, life's tough. Instead of being the only three people on a 60 passenger bus, perhaps these people will have to introduce themselves, get to know their neighbours and share a taxi.

This paragraph particularly indicates that Towhey has no idea how unprofitable a transit system is. Unless he believes most of the busiest routes in the system have "three people on a 60 passenger bus", he is uninformed about the fare recovery ratios. If the TTC dumped all unprofitable routes, all would be gone. If they dumped all that have no potential to become profitable, all but six would be gone. "Life is tough" may be an interesting way to dismiss those who rely on transit, but it would apply to the entire city when those who use almost any TTC surface route begin to drive. This isn't even accounting for GO Transit...

Anyway, it's obvious that Towhey has no knowledge of the transit system. It's easy to complain that the TTC is inefficient when you ignore that it is, in actuality, one of the most efficient transit systems on the planet. I really hope that Ford does not listen to this advisor on any views related to transit, or our city might be in serious trouble.

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The first thing worth noting is by the end of this year, we should have a formal study complete to determine potential ridership, capacity, and transit policy. While it will be interesting to see how ridership projections align with those provided on this website, the more interesting report will come by the end of 2011, which will determine possible routes and station locations. While the route proposed on this site is slightly different than previously proposed routes, it is assumed that the main routes that will be studied will be determining whether to use Pape or Donlands in the east, the rail corridor or straight down to Queen, and then whether to run into the downtown via Queen, King, Front, or The Esplanade.

Giambrone mentions that the line would be constructed either as a full subway, or an LRT subway. If it is constructed as an LRT subway it would be a huge mistake given the potential ridership of this line, and I'm sure the report will draw the same conclusion, and Giambrone is just covering all bases. Still, lately there has been an LRT vs. Subways debate in the Mayoral platforms and among transit circles, but it should always be kept in mind that different technologies should not be at war, but are suited for different applications. LRT is for lower capacity, and is especially useful for if you want surface vehicles to head underground, such as on Eglinton or on Queen. This way a transfer could be eliminated. With the DRL, the ridership is there for a full subway and it is not integrated with an existing surface route.

Giambrone goes on to question if the new ridership generated from new condo development and office space offsets the loss of major employers citing Massey Ferguson, but it should be clear that the jobs lost at Massey are more than made up for by new development. For one, the first stage of the DRL, and what was originally planned for in the 1980's proposal, did not go past Spadina, and thus would not have made it all the way to Massey anyway. Secondly, in 1986, there were 2,300 employees at the struggling firm¹. For a sense of perspective, between the census of 2006 and 2010, almost 20,000 residents and jobs have been created from Pape to Spadina, the approximate original route of the line. In just the last four years, the Massey employment has been not only accounted for in terms of ridership, but surpassed by almost 8.5 times. This ignores any development between 1985 and 2006. The loss of Massey-Ferguson was insignificant to the DRL, and likely resulted in greater density in terms of what replaced it.

The most troublesome thing Giambrone says is at the end of the article, when he comments that "[...] the last few months have shown there is little appetite financially at the Province for large projects, so it will be interesting to see if the DRL is ever built." Hopefully, this is just a shot at the funding cuts for Transit City rather than any sort of legitimate concern, as it seems that the Province has been more willing to fund projects in recent years. More importantly, with the report the Toronto Board of Trade released, we have various methods to generate a billion dollars annually, which can easily fund construction. We just need the political will rather than just nay saying.

It saddens me to think that the TTC's chair, as much as he sees the value of the line and is committed to studying it, still does not seem to understand the urgency at which we must move on this, and the necessity of the line. Hopefully after the release of these reports the TTC will begin to back a stronger push for the DRL.

¹"Massey-Ferguson unveils restructuring plan." Montreal Gazette 4 Mar. 1986, FIN ed.: D6.

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Smitherman's plan would see the Spadina extension constructed by 2015, along with the Sheppard LRT, the Queen's Quay LRT, the airport rail link, and the beginning of work on the Eglinton LRT. Though there are some small changes, most of this is already in the plans and is nothing ground-breaking.

The second stage of his plan is more interesting. Some of the ideas are also on the books and expected to occur (Finch West LRT), other ideas have been discussed at length and although not formally planned are expected to happen (Replacement of Scarborough RT with subway), and the remaining two ideas are much less often discussed (a subway extension of Bloor to Sherway Gardens and a subway extension of Sheppard to Downsview).

I won't get into detail on the Finch West plan, as it is part of Transit City and has thus been frequently analyzed before. The subway construction options are very poorly thought out. There is nothing wrong with replacing the Scarborough RT with an extension of the Danforth subway to Scarborough Town Centre. The Scarborough RT has severe capacity limitations, and it would eliminate a transfer for those coming from Scarborough and save them a significant amount of time. The flaw in the plan isn't the idea, but the representation of it. In maps, Smitherman simply chooses to draw over the Scarborough RT with a new subway line, which isn't feasible due to the tight turns of the RT. Obviously if this were to be constructed, another route would be chosen to get the subway to Scarborough Town Centre, but by simply redrawing the Scarborough RT as a subway, it brings into question how much research was really done into this proposal.

The other lines are even worse, not just looking poorly researched, but having little to no value relative to the money that would have to be spent on them. An extension of the Sheppard Subway west to Downsview would provide a northern connection between the Yonge and Spadina lines, and make it easier for York University students who live east of Dufferin to commute to York, but there is not nearly enough demand for this to justify the cost. In the 2001 Rapid Transit Expansion Study, the TTC said the following regarding extending the Sheppard subway west to Downsview:

While there would be some strategic benefit in terms of encouraging Sheppard Subway riders to utilize the Spadina Subway line (rather the Yonge Subway line) to access the downtown core and in providing additional network connectivity for a variety of trip origins and destinations, a westerly extension of the Sheppard Subway is not considered a high priority in the short to medium term.

To put in perspective on just how low this subway ranks in terms of priority, out of the fifteen options of subway expansion considered in the report, this was one of only three that did not meet the requirements to justify further consideration. Since the report, little has changed on Sheppard west of Yonge. This line is still unnecessary, and the money can be spent in far better ways elsewhere.

The other line proposed is an extension of the Bloor-Danforth subway west to Sherway Gardens. As someone who lives in Etobicoke, one may think I would support giving Etobicoke a higher level of rapid transit than what currently exists. While I would support rapid transit to Northern Etobicoke, an extension of the Bloor-Danforth subway to Sherway Gardens makes little if any sense. Again, this was studied in the Rapid Transit Expansion Study. The peak point passengers per hour was listed as only 700 for this extension, far below every other line considered. While density has increased since the report, the increase is not substantial enough to warrant a subway. In the report, the extension to Sherway was rated as having "No chance for success". The report notes this extension would be one of the least cost effective to construct, with "development potential" being the only positive for the line.

These subways have no basis in planning and everything to do with politics, which is exemplified by Smitherman's promise to give free transit to the elderly. The revenue loss that this would bring to the system would be substantial, as the TTC collects roughly $876 million per year in revenue from the fare box. If seniors account for roughly 10-15% of that revenue, that would mean a shortfall of $87.6-$131.4 million annually. Reading on in the report, it is established that a 25 cent increase in fare and a roughly $5 increase in the price of a metropass can generate $62.5 million. This means if seniors are to get free transit, the rest of us will have to deal with a significant increase in fares to make up for the lost revenue. Smitherman never addresses this, nor where the revenue will come from for these subways to nowhere. Vague references to contracting with the private sector is all we're told, with Smitherman eliminating the possibility of tolls.

While I had high hopes to find logic in Smitherman's transit plan, unfortunately little if any exists. Right now Sarah Thomson seems like the only candidate with a reasonable (though underestimated in terms of cost) subway plan, while Joe Pantalone has a reasonable transit plan simply continuing construction of Transit City. I hope some of the other candidates reconsider their plans for the good of Toronto.

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Rob Ford: Ford plans on scrapping the current "Transit City" rapid transit plan and focusing on subway construction. Though he has not outlined which subways he would plan on constructing, he has stated how he would try to fund them.

His plan to raise money involves selling the air rights above TTC properties to developers. Though selling air rights is unquestionably a good idea, Ford may be overstating its importance and how much revenue it can bring in. To put the value of selling air rights into perspective, we can obtain a rough estimate of how much selling air rights can net the TTC. In 1988, the air rights to a 3.6 hectare site at Yonge and Eglinton were valued at $30 million¹. Though the current value of TTC air rights possibilities have not been publicly released, we can try to extrapolate based on this figure. Since 1988, the average selling price of homes in Toronto has gone up 78%. While this does not guarantee the Eglinton lands have gone up by the same value, it gives us an approximation. The 3.6 hectare site can therefore be seen as being worth around $53.4 million. In 2002, the TTC created a report studying the opportunities for the sale of air rights, where they established ten properties that would be fitting for sale. These properties totalled around 5 hectares. This would mean that selling the air rights on all these properties would generate less than $100 million, or 1/3 of a kilometre of subway for all useful air rights currently in the TTC system. As much as selling air rights is a good idea in order to create greater density around subway stations and encourage a higher level of ridership, the value of them is not substantial enough in order to fund subway construction.

Georgio Mammoliti: Mammoliti has not weighed in on a specific transit plan, but has proposed corporate naming to finance subway construction, and handing the TTC back to the province. Unfortunately, neither of these ideas are likely viable. In terms of handing the TTC back to the province, it's simply not that easy. If the City of Toronto could rid itself of all its financial obligations that easily, we wouldn't have the budget issues we do every year. In regards to corporate naming, much like Ford with air rights, Mammoliti vastly overestimates the value of corporate sponsorship. The TTC's total income from advertising is $13.3 million annually. Even if the naming rights to a subway and all the stations along it were to equal the revenue the TTC generates from all other forms of advertising, that amount would be negligible compared to the overall construction costs of a subway.

Joe Pantalone: Pantalone plans to continue pursuing Toronto's "Transit City" plan. In regards to subway construction, he says he is "not opposed to [it]", but believes we need transit sooner rather than later and the Transit City plan can be built faster. Unless Pantalone chooses to expand on what he means when he claims that he is not opposed to subway expansion, it is hard to determine whether or not he would be in favour or opposed to the Downtown Relief Line.

Rocco Rossi:To his credit, Rossi has been one of the most forthcoming of all the candidates in terms of revealing their transit plans. Unfortunately, his plans still have a number of flaws with them. Rossi plans to cancel Transit City and instead implement his own plan of "Transit City Plus", which would cost $450 million a year for 10 years, building 2 km of subway per year. His plan would see Sheppard extended east to Scarborough Town Centre first, followed by the Yonge North extension before the Downtown Relief Line is considered. The first problem with this plan is the projected cost. Rossi assumes a cost of $225 million per kilometre. One of his priority extensions is the Yonge North extension, a curious choice for someone running for the Mayor of a city that will see limited benefit and simply increased crowding. His $225 million figure on this line is known to be low, as the Yonge extension has already been analyzed and determined to cost in the range of $350 million per kilometre, before the necessary improvements to the line to increase capacity, which will cost billions and have to be done if the Downtown Relief Line is not built first, as per Rossi's plan.

Not only are the estimates of subway construction too low, but the plan to pay for the cost of construction is also overstated. The rate of return on the City of Toronto's share of Toronto Hydro is greater than the level of interest paid on the debt. This means that a sale of Toronto Hydro as proposed by Rossi to fund transit expansion, will actually result in less annual income and rid the city of one of its major assets if we're ever in dire need of cash in future budget crunches.

Rossi's plan is misguided, expecting to extend subways with no free capacity at a cost substantially lower than what the actual cost will be, with a financing plan that will actually lose the city money. If he is to be elected, I would highly suggest reconsidering his plan on transit.

George Smitherman: Smitherman still has yet to release much detail in terms of what he will do regarding transit in Toronto. Some clues have been given, however. He has criticized Rocco Rossi's plan heavily, with specific focus on Eglinton Avenue, so it should be safe to assume that his plans will include rapid transit on Eglinton. Beyond that, little is known until he fully releases his plan for transit. There has been speculation that he will be supporting the Downtown Relief Line, but until there is an official statement on that, not much faith can be put into it.

Sarah Thomson: Thomson has released a well-defined plan for transit expansion, planning to fund it by tolling the Gardiner Expressway and Don Valley Parkway. Though her cost estimates of subway construction ($200 million per km) are far too low much like the other candidates, her plan of raising revenue appears more realistic than the other candidates who have been that specific with their plans. Thomson believe that a $5 rush hour toll on the Gardiner and DVP could raise $400-$500 million per year, which seems a little high but within reason given the Toronto Board of Trade's estimate that a $0.10 per km toll on all 400-series highways in the region could generate $1 billion annually.

Though the Downtown Relief Line south of Bloor-Danforth is on Sarah Thomson's map (using a Queen alignment), it does not go north of there. This is not of major concern, as it Thomson has made it clear that she would support subway construction, but has not released any specific priorities. She may be convinced of the value of the DRL from Danforth north to Eglinton.

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The method of revenue generating that stood out to me was a $1 per day parking charge on commercial parking spaces. Given the overall cost of parking, $1 for an entire day does not seem overbearing, and more impressively, it can generate $1 billion per year. This is easily enough to cover not only a good chunk of construction for the Downtown Relief Line, but other transit improvements that can get the city moving again. This is not an uncommon practice, and is being used by our Great Lakes neighbour Chicago to generate income, where they've set the tax rate between $0.75 and $2.00. One of the main benefits to this tax is it would be a lot less politically contentious than road tolls, a higher gas tax, or congestion charges, all of which are increases that can be seen and are directly paid by the public. Commercial parking tax would be paid by businesses, and ultimately passed on to the consumer, but with a rate of $1 per space per day, only a small fraction of that would be burdened onto each consumer, making their overall shopping experience change by so little that it would barely go noticed.

Regardless of what method of revenue generating is chosen, the benefits of the subway that revenue can build far outweigh most of the options presented in this report, and it should be given serious consideration by our politicians in order to get some shovels in the ground.